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Senator Robert Byrd (D-W Virginia) called the idea ofsame-sex
marriages "absurd, "and readfrom the Bible to buttress his argu-
ment that such marriages flew "in the face of the thousands of
years of experience about the societal stability that traditional
marriage has afforded human civilization.",
INTRODUCTION
President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
into law on September 21, 1996, at 12:50 a.m., less than six weeks
before the November general elections.3 The timing suggests that
Congress passed DOMA before other more legitimate legislation in
order to raise an issue which could influence that election's outcome.
4
The early hour was transparently Clinton's "attempt to lessen media
coverage [of] and political fallout"5 from his unavoidable capitulation
to religious conservatives.6 These strained circumstances are in keeping
1. 142 CONG. Rc. S10,108-09 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
2. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L No. 104-199, 110 Star. 2419 (1996).
3. See Kim A. Lawton, Clinton Signs Law Backing Heterosexual Marriage, CHRusITMnY
ToDAY, Oct. 28, 1996, at 80, 80.
4. See e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S10,579-80 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Pell). In a statement explaining his decision to oppose DOMA, Sen. Pell said:
[I]t is dear to me that this legislation is politically motivated. By making
this unnecessary bill a priority of this Congress, while failing to act on nu-
merous other measures of much more immediate importance, the
Republican leadership has made dear its desire to try to embarrass those
.who have traditionally supported equal rights for all Americans, including
gays and lesbians.
142 CONG. Rac. S10,580 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Pell).
5. Lawton, supra note 3, at 80.
6. DOMA's advocates intended either to compel Clinton to commit a damningly liberal
deed by vetoing it or to alienate Clinton from a solid constituency by signing it, all
before the upcoming November elections. Those with even the slightest amount of
political acumen knew that once DOMA had gone as far as it had, Clinton could not
veto it without endangering his chances for re-election. See John Gallagher, Speak
Now: Searching for a Popular Election-Year Wedge Issue, Congressional Republicans
Launch an Attack on Gay Marriage, AnvocATE, June 11, 1996, at 20. To veto
DOMA, Clinton would have had to set aside his personal objections to same-sex
marriage in the interest of others' civil liberties. See J. Jennings Moss, Wedding Bell
Blues: Clinton's Stated Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage Places the President Squarely on
the Horns of a Political Dilemma, ADvocArs, May 14, 1996, at 20. Conflicted by
these competing interests, Clinton sought the path of minimal cost, and thus in the
thick of night with no one watching, he signed DOMA into law. Without this pres-
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with DOMA's character ab inicio as an unusually complex piece of
legislation.
Whatever its faults, DOMA has the virtue of brevity. Section 2,
entitled "Powers Reserved to the States," authorizes states to ignore
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriages:
No Staie, territory, or possession of the United States, or In-
dian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, pos-
session, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or
claim arising from such relationship.7
Section 3 of DOMA is both less abstract than Section 2 and
more controversial. Entitled "Definition of Marriage," this passage
states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administra-
tive bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word
"marriage" means only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.8
Despite-their advertised simplicity,9 both sections pack constitu-
tional wallops.
Most analyses of DOMA direct their attentions to the constitu-
tionality of the effects of this legislation: Does it violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution? Does it transgress the Consti-
tutional requirements of Due Process? Does DOMA grant states a
thick of night with no one watching, he signed DOMA into law. Without this pres-
sure from the political right, Clinton would have acted in keeping with his long-held
policy of supporting gays and lesbians, and vetoed DOMA.
7. Defense of Marriage Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.CJ. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997).
8. Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997).
9. Defense ofMarriage Act:. Hearing on H. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm..on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1996) [hereinafter House
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Canady) ("[The Act simply restates the current and
long-established understanding [of what] marriage means.").
19971
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power they did not already possess, namely, the power to ignore ex-
traterritorial marriages?'0
This Article, however, takes a different approach and scrutinizes
the constitutionality of the intent of DOMA. According to the text of
the Act, DOMA's purposes are "to define and protect the institution
of marriage,"" where marriage is defined to exclude same-sex partners.
To be constitutionally valid under the Establishment Clause, this no-
tion that heterosexual marriages require "protection" from gay and
lesbian persons must spring from a secular and not religious source.
This Article posits that DOMA has crossed this forbidden line be-
tween the secular and the religious. DOMA, motivated and supported
by fundamentalist Christian ideology,'2 and lacking any genuine
secular goals or justifications, betrays the Establishment Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
10. These questions, and much of the earlier literature considering them, are reviewed
and summarized by MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE
CONsTrrrON (1997). Strasser does not consider the implications of the Establish-
ment Clause for DOMA.
11. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub: L No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
12. The group of antigay advocates supporting DOMA will consistently be glossed herein
as "fundamentalist Christians," although many pro-DOMA individuals would not so
label themselves. Technically, "fundamentalism" refers to:
the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that dearly contains
the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity
and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of
evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed to-
day according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and
that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a spe-
cial relationship with the deity.
RALPH W. HOOD, JR. E' AL., THE PSYCHOLtOG OF REIGION: AN EMPIRICAL AP-
PROACH 366 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting B. Altemeyer & B. Hunsberger,
Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prudice, 2 Itr'L J. FOR PsY-
CHOL. RELIGION 113, 118 (1992)); see also RoNAD B. FLowERs, THAT GODLESS
COURT? 93 (1994). Fundamentalism in America is overwhelmingly Christian, al-
though Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists are common in other cultures. Most
Catholics fall outside this technical "fundamentalist" definition, since on the whole
they are open to the amending of sctiptural authority by papal decree and other cur-
rent events. However, on the particular issue of homosexuality the Catholic Church
has not demonstrated this willingness to reinterpret the few relevant Biblical refer-
ences. This Artide therefore embraces Catholics within the "Fundamentalist
Christian" concept.
[Vol. 4:335
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The tools to evaluate DOMA are provided by Lemon v. Kurtz-
man13 and Edwards v. Aguillard.14 In these cases, the Supreme Court
has synthesized and systematized its thinking on the Establishment
Clause, and the criteria by which a court may determine if it has been
transgressed. Part I reviews the development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence through the articulation of the Lemon test.'5 Part II de-
scribes the instructions the Supreme Court provided in Edwards v.
Aguillard'6 for applying the Lemon test. Part III submits DOMA to a
13. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For discussion of Lemon see infira notes
27-32 and accompanying text. This Article assumes that Lemon provides the proper
standard by which DOMA should be evaluated. However, the Lemon test is uni-
formly neither appreciated nor applied by the Court. The evolving consensus is that
the test is not ideally tailored to all fact situations. Cf. LEONAR W. LEVY, THE Es-
TABUSHMENT CLAUSE 156-59 (2d ed. rev. 1994) (stating that while Lemon is
adequate in itself, it fails as a one-size-fits-all tool for Establishment Clause analysis).
A broader selection of more tightly specific rules would generate more sensible and
consistent outcomes. Justice O'Connor, for instance, has been particularly vocal
about calling for a reconsideration of the place of Lemon in constitutional jurispru-
dence. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, reasons that the purpose prong of Lemon is
impermissible because a purpose inquiry is "almost always an impossible task." Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
purpose prong of the Lemon test should be abandoned); see also Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (finding the Arkansas anti-
evolution statute unconstitutional for its vagueness, not its religiosity, because the
search for motives was "too difflcult"-although only religious motives were ex-
pressed). Swayed by Scalia's arguments, at least one commentator has called for the
elimination of the purpose prong, stating that it "present[s] a test too difficult to ap-
ply ... [since the] sources which reveal such intent can be 'contrived and sanitized,
favorable media coverage orchestrated, and post-enactment [sic] recollections con-
veniently distorted.'" Jeffrey S. Theuer, Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjective
Intent in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case fbr Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76
Ky. LJ. 1061, 1072-73 (1987-88) (foomote omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Despite these expressed misgivings, the Lemon test is still the official standard
when seeking to adjudicate appeals to the Constitution's Establishment Clause. But
cf Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that because the Founding
Fathers, who wrote the First Amendment, approved of legislative chaplains, Nebraska
Legislature's chaplaincy practice did not violate the Establishment Clause). Thus, this
Article uses the purpose prong of the Lemon test to analyze the constitutionality of
DOMA.
14. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). For discussion ofAguillard see infra Part
II.
15. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
16. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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Lemon analysis as interpreted by Aguillard, examining DOMA's legis-
lative history as well as the current and historical contexts from which
it arises.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Religion Clauses of the Constitution's First Amendment
read, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."17 This passage contains
both the non-Establishment and the Free Exercise guarantees; our at-
tention focuses on the former.' The Establishment Clause forbids the
federal and state governments to prefer one religion over another."
This Part reviews Supreme Court jurisprudence considering laws that
exhibited this preference.
Epperson v. Arkansas0 was an early effort to articulate which laws
violate the Establishment Clause. In Epperson, the Supreme Court
struck an Arkansas statute which outlawed the teaching of evolution.
The Court held the law to be an unusually blatant attempt to legislate
fundamentalist Christian theology:
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body
of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular re-
ligious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.2'
In reaching its unequivocal conclusion "that fundamentalist sec-
tarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence,",2 the
Court established two precedents. First, the Court found that "the
religious views of some of its citizens"' provided the only justification
for the Arkansas statute. Even if the Court had been predisposed to
17. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
18. For a discussion of the historical and social context of the Establishment Clause, see
LEVY, supra note 13.
19. A question exists regarding whether the government can prefer all religions over non-
religion, if such a thing is possible. See Lzr, supra note 13, at xvi-xxii, But this
debate need not concern us here, since the present issue dearly centers on one par-
ticular religion, fundamentalist Christianity, to the exclusion of others.
20. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
21. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.
22. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 108.
23. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107.
[Vol. 4:335
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accept some nonreligious rationale for the criminalization of the
teaching of Darwinian evolution, the record reflected no such alterna-
tive explanation for the statute. As a result, the court held that any law
wholly without secular purpose is a law presumptively motivated by
religion, and thereby forbidden by the First Amendment.4
The second precedent from Epperson relates to the lineage of a
contested law. Although the Arkansas statute did not explicitly claim
that its purpose was to further fundamentalist Christianity, its text was
modeled on a Tennessee statute which did include such language. 25
Given the Arkansas adoption of this Tennessee law, the Court sensibly
analogized from the one to the other, concluding without a doubt that
"the motivation for the [Arkansas] law was the same." Thus, the
Court looked beyond explicit claims into the unspoken social and po-
litical contexts which may have also influenced the legislative process.
Even if overt language of the law is inoffensive, Epperson instructs that
knowledge of the specific social, intellectual, and philosophical pedi-
gree of a statute may suffice to find constitutional insult.
The influence of Epperson was particularly important in 1971
when the Supreme Court created an actual "test" to determine when a
law violated the Establishment Clause. Lemon v. Kurtzman27 involved
a Rhode Island plan to offer supplemental pay to nonpublic school
teachers who teach only classes also taught in public schools and use
only approved public school materials.' The sole beneficiaries of the
extra payments were 250 teachers in Roman Catholic schools. Because
parochial schools play a critical role in the religious functioning of the
Catholic Church, the question was whether these payments were un-
constitutional establishments.
24. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-08 (holding that "[i]t is clear that fundamentalist sec-
tarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence" because "[n]o suggestion
ha[d] been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state policy"
(emphasis added)). In a later case, Wallace v. Jafflee, the Court reasoned that all new
legislation should be presumed to be an attempt to change existing law, and hence
not pointless. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
25. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98 ("The Arkansas statute was an adaptation of the famous
Tennessee 'monkey law' .... " (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1922 (1966 Repl.
Vol.))). This law was the focus of the Scopes trial. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363
(Tenn. 1927).
26. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
27. Lemon v. Kurrman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
28. See id. at 607-08. Lemon also included consideration of a similarly-themed Pennsyl-
vania plan, which is not discussed here. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609-11.
1997]
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The Court articulated three criteria to ascertain whether religion
impermissibly motivated a government action. These criteria have be-
come known as the "Lemon test." A law is unconstitutional if it
transgresses any of these three standards: "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... ; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.'""
Nine years after establishing this test, the Supreme Court invoked
the first standard, otherwise known as the purpose prong of Lemon, in
Stone v. Graham." In Stone, the Court considered a Kentucky statute
which required the public schools to post the Ten Commandments in
each classroom. Although the state asserted an "avowed" secular pur-
pose-highlighting the decalogue's role in the formation of Western
Civilization-the Court ruled that an "'avowed' secular purpose is
not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment," and that
"no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind [the
Court] to" the "plainly religious" nature of the Ten Command-
ments. 3' Therefore the Court held that the Kentucky statute "violates
the first part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, and thus the Establish-
ment Clause of the Constitution."3 2 In essence, the enduring
precedent from Stone extends the lesson learned earlier in Epperson:
The Court is not bound to accept without scrutiny the legislature's
routine assurances that a law was not impermissibly religiously moti-
vated. Rather, the Court is free to look deeper into relevant evidence,
such as religious pedigree.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,33 another significant purpose prong case, the
Supreme Court found that religious concerns were the sole motivation
for an Alabama statute requiring a minute of silence in public schools
29. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The development and treatment of the Lemon test is
briefly reviewed in Luvy, supra note 13, at 157-59.
30. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
31. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
32. Stone, 449 U.S. at 43. With an eye toward the eventual adjudication of DOMA, it is
worthwhile to note that now-Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from this result ban-
ning the required posting of the Ten Commandments. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 43-47
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. Wallace v. Jafflree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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for meditation or voluntary prayer.-" Alabama already had a required
moment of silence in which those who were so inclined could silently
pray if they chose; the new law amended the previous statutes to en-
courage the use of that time specifically for voluntary prayer as
opposed to meditation or quiet reflection, for instance. As this was the
only change to the law's text, and as new legislation is presumed to be
an attempt to change existing law,35 the Court construed the change as
the manifestation of the State's intent "to characterize prayer as a fa-
vored practice."' The Alabama statute thus failed the purpose prong
of the Lemon test, and therefore violated the First Amendment of the
Constitution.37
The fact that the challenged law permitted no new actions cued
the Court to the exclusively religious purpose of the Alabama statute.
School children in that state already had the right to a moment of si-
lence for use in whatever manner they chose. Adding "voluntary
prayer" to the list of possible uses did not make that use suddenly and
newly available, but only underscored the state's approval and encour-
agement of the moment of silence for that use. By this example, if a
law grants no new powers or abilities, that law is likely a symbol of
support for some cause which may or may not be appropriate, and
thus warrants close scrutiny.
In summary, the purpose prong of the Lemon test focuses on
what the legislators could reasonably be presumed to have been
thinking when they enacted the new law.38 The inquiries it authorizes
include: Did they know, or could they reasonably be presumed to
have known, that a piece of legislation had emerged from a wellspring
of religious mandate? Was this knowledge just one of many influences
on their decision to enact the law, or was it the sole or primary factor?
Under Stone, the purpose for the law must be primarily and not
superficially secular.39 Any law with primarily religious motivation is
34. See id. at 56-57 (finding that the bill's sponsor admitted to the religious motivation
of the Alabama statute).
35. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59 & n.48.
36. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
37. Again with an eye toward eventual judgment on DOMA's constitutionality, we ob-
serve that now-Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from Wallace as he did from Stone.
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Stone, 449 U.S. at 43. Chief
Justice Rehnquist is apparently not well-disposed to claims that legislation advancing
religious causes, and only religious causes, are necessarily suspect.
38. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
39. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-43.
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to be treated as though it were motivated wholly by religion. 0 In turn,
any law stemming wholly from religious concerns transgresses the Es-
tablishment Clause and is to be struck down as unconstitutional."1
Clues to the hidden religious motivations of a law may be found in
the intellectual lineage of the text (Epperson, Stone), or in the failure of
the law to grant new powers or abilities (Wallace).
In two of the reviewed cases, Epperson and Wallace, it was not
difficult for the Court to discover the legislative intent at work
because in neither case was a secular reason offered for the statutes at
issue. When the record is more complex, as in the case of DOMA,
some direction is needed as to where to look for this intent. The
Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguillard offers this
direction.
II. EDwAiws v AGoULLARD: INSTRUCTIONS To APPLY LEMON V KUR7ZMAN
Edwards v. Aguillard"2 addresses the same subject matter treated
by Epperson: an anti-evolution statute.3 Louisiana's "Balanced Treat-
ment Act"" compelled the schools to teach Genesis-inspired creation-
ism whenever Darwinian evolutionary theory was introduced into the
classroom. Although welcome to ignore both "theor[ies]," the law for-
bade teachers to introduce the one without the other.
45
Aguillard struck the Balanced Treatment Act, finding it furthered
a primarily religious, and therefore unconstitutional, purpose.46 The
40. This conclusion derives from contrasting O'Connor's depiction of Stone in her con-
currence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (finding that in Stone
there was only an incidental secular justification for displaying the Ten Command-
ments), with the Lynch majority's characterization of the case as one which the Court
found to be "motivated wholly by religious considerations." Id. at 680.
41. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
42. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
43. For a review of the case history on this topic, see Judith A. Villarreal, Note and
Comment, God and Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation/Evolution Controversy, 64
CMI.-KENT L Rnv. 335 (1988).
44. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982).
45. L. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.4(A) (West 1982).
46. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 585-94. The Aguillard court stated:
meaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind
to schoolchildren might be validly done with the dear secular intent of en-
hancing the effectiveness of science instruction. But because the primary
purpose of the [Balanced Treatment] Act is to endorse a particular religious
doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
[Vol. 4:335
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Supreme Court agreed with and cited the Court of Appeals' finding
that the legislature's "actual intent was 'to discredit evolution by
counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of crea-
tionism, a religious belief."" 7
In reaching this result, the Court first had to evaluate and ulti-
mately dismiss a purported secular legislative purpose which would
justify the Act. While the first prong of the Lemon test required that
the legislative purpose be secular and not religious, the Aguillard
Court explicitly required that "the statement of such purpose be sin-
cere and not a sham."' s In other words, where Lemon directs the courts
toward the crucial question-what is the purpose of the law?-
Aguillard ultimately guides the courts through the kinds of informa-
tion which they can consult to arrive at a proper answer. The Court
identified six areas of permissible inquiry which would facilitate this
evaluation of purpose: (1) whether the legislative history contains
overt religious justification for the law, especially from the sponsor;49
(2) whether the law functions solely symbolically by failing to author-
ize any new authority;- ° (3) the extent to which the law's operation is
underinclusive relative to its stated purpose;5' (4) the history behind
the topic and its prior ties to religion;" (5) the current social and po-
Aguillarad 482 U.S. at 594.
47. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 582 (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th
Cir. 1985)). For an impressively effective articulation of the differences between re-
ligion and science, concluding that creationism is necessarily a religious dogma despite
its attempts to repackage itself as an alternative scientific theory, see Andrew D. Bing,
Note, Evolution, Creationism and the Religion Clauses, 46 ALB. L Rr. 897, 926-32
(1982). Summed into one sentence, the difference is that creation-science "'is not a
scientific theory about nature in search of inconsistent data, ... but a faith in a
Creator in search of consistent data.'" Edward J. Larson, A Spectators Guide to
Aguillard v. Edwards: Part Il-Textbooks, Judges, and Science, 17 CUMB. L Rav. 116,
133 (1986) (quoting the ACLU brief, Brief of Appellees at 26-27, Edwards v.
Aguillard (U.S. 1986) (No. 85-1513)).
48. Aguillard 482 U.S. at 586-87.
49. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 586-87, 591-92.
50. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 587 ("The Act provides Louisiana schoolteachers with no
new authority. Thus the stated purpose is not furthered by it.").
51. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 588 ("If the Louisiana Legislature's purpose was solely to
maximize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science'instruction, it would
have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins of human-
kind.").
52. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 595.
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litical context from which the law emerged;" and (6) whether the ex-
plicit text of the law expresses a religious purpose.5
The Balanced Treatment Act presented problems, on all inquiries
save the last." While the advocates of the Balanced Treatment Act of-
fered the secular reason of advancing academic freedom,"6 the sponsor
of the Act, Senator Keith, intended to narrow the science curriculum,
"My preference would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be
taught."57 The Court found this attitude unexpected if the goal truly
was to advance academic freedom, and thus the legislative history re-
vealed the secular reason to be a sham.
The Court further rebutted the sincerity of the purported pur-
pose of advancing academic freedom because "[t]he Act [did] not
grant teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess .... The
Act provides Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority. Thus
the stated purpose is not furthered by it." 8 This failure to grant new
authority to the teachers led the Court to conclude that despite pro-
tests to the contrary, "[tihe Act violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and
financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose. ""
The Aguillard Court also argued that the Act was underinclusive,
which thus made the sincerity of the "academic freedom" purpose
53. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 594-95.
54. SeeAguillard 482 U.S. at 594-95.
55. The majority opinion does not evaluate the Balanced Treatment Act relative to its
overt text. However, the concurring opinion by Justice Powell does, concluding that
"[firom the face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is apparent."
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 581. Bing, supra note 47, at 900-11, summarizes argu-
ments that the Balanced Treatment Act-this time, the one in Arkansas, which was
genetically related to the similarly titled act in Louisiana-is required by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. Bing ultimately finds that "the state generally has no legitimate interest
in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to their adherents." Bing, su-
pra note 47, at 909; see also Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058
(6th Cir. 1987) (examining whether the government creates an unconstitutional bur-
den on the free exercise of religion by requiring exposure to questionable ideas).
57. Aguiflard, 482 U.S. at 587 (alteration in original).
58. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 587. The Court analogizes this lack of new authority from the
Balanced Treatment Act with the meditation law struck by Wallace v. Jafflee, 472
U.S. 38 (1985). The law in Wallace similarly failed to enable new abilities or powers,
instead serving only to indicate the state's approval and encouragement of prayer
during that moment of silence. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 587.
59. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 597.
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suspect.6° The Court noted that if by such freedom they mean to en-
courage the fair "'teaching [of] all of the evidence,' " the Act displays
a "discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation science and
against the teaching of evolution" 2 which belies the claim of promot-
ing fairness.
Because alternatives were available which aligned more closely
with the espoused goal of "fairness,"63 the Court rejects the sincerity of
"academic freedom" as the purpose of the Balanced Treatment Act. 6
Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act's significant underinclusion in
practice relative to its stated purpose flags the Act for further Estab-
lishment Clause scrutiny.
The Aguillard Court also noted a historical "link between the
teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evo-
lution" which was reviewed in Epperson.6' This history supported the
Court's conclusion that "the term 'creation science,' as contemplated
by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the religious belief
that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of human-
kind." Finding that the antagonistic link between creation science
and evolution is not only historic, but "contemporaneous,"67 the
Court also examined present day influences. In this process, the Court
found that the Senator's religious views impacted the passage of the
Act: "The state senator [Senator Keith] repeatedly stated that scientific
evidence supporting his religious views should be included in the
public school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolu-
tion incidentally coincided with what he characterized as religious
60. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 586, 588.
61. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 586 (quoting the Transcript of Oral Argument at 60).
62. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 588 (noting that the Act requires the development of curricu-
lum guides, the availability of resource services, and the protection against
discrimination for creation scientists only).
63. For example, the Act could have "encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories
about the origins of humankind." Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 588.
64. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 593 (stating that "[olut of many possible science subjects
taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the teaching of the one sci-
entific theory that historically has been opposed by certain religious sects").
65. Aguillar4 482 U.S. at 590. The court also notes that "[tlhe[ ] same historic.., an-
tagonisms between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching
of evolution are present in this case" as they were in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968). Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 590-91.
66. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 592.
67. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 590, 591.
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beliefs antithetical to his own."6 Thus, "because the primary purpose
of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine,
the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause."69
Given that the Balanced Treatment Act violated five of the six
inquiries, the Court judged the Act's stated jiurpose of promoting
academic freedom or basic educational fairness to be a sham intended
to hide the fundamentally religious nature of the law.7"
III. APPLYING LMONX LAAGUILL4RD TO DOMA
The Supreme Court's dissection of the Balanced Treatment Act
in Aguillard provides a clear model to evaluate any other law relative
to the Establishment Clause. Part III applies this model point-by-
point to DOMA. This Part concludes by noting that the facts imput-
ing DOMA's violation of the Establishment Clause are at least as
strong as those implicating the Balanced Treatment Act, and are often
even less ambivalent. Consequently, as the Aguillard analysis found
68. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 592. Based on my personal experience of living in Louisiana, it
ftuther seems that the Senator's views reflected broad social trends in Louisiana.
69. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 594. Finally, Aguillard, also specified that "[the plain meaning
of the statute's words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legisla-
tive history, can control the determination of legislative purpose." Aguillard, 482 U.S.
at 594. Unfortunately, some jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, actually have very poor
legislative histories. The Louisiana legislature publishes no legislative history other
than its calendar. Committee meetings are tape-recorded. Tapes are archived from
the House only from 1976, however, and the Senate keeps only the last two years,
although minutes (but not transcripts) are available for earlier years. Even this level of
documentation is not afforded to general floor discussion, which leaves a trail in nei-
ther print nor audiotape. The Aguillard dissent notes the lack of significant legislative
history behind the Balanced Treatment Act. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
70. SeeAguillard, 482 U.S. at 588-91. The Balanced Treatment Act violated only five of
the six inquiries because it did not appear to have a religious purpose on its face. Leg-
islatures have become very sophisticated in their drafting of bills, however; even when
they filly intend to impose a religious dogma upon the electorate, they rarely state
this end in the bill itself. In neither the Balanced Treatment Act nor DOMA does the
text itself discuss religious purposi. They contain no clause such as, "In order to has-
ten the arrival of Christ's Kingdom on earth we enact the following .... Aguillard
therefore does not dwell on the surface text in its analysis, although the "plain mean-
ing of the statute's words" is rightly identified as a proper place to look. Aguillard,
482 U.S. at 594. Instead the Court devotes itself to laying bare the more subtle con-
notations and ancestry of the text. This Article's application of Aguillard to DOMA
likewise will not discuss the surface text.
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the Balanced Treatment Act to be an undonstitutional establishment,
so it must also find DOMA.
A. Legislative History ofDOMA
We as legislators and leaders for the country are in the
midst of a chaos, an attack upon God's principles. God laid
down that one man and one woman is a legal union. That is
marriage, known for thousands of years. That God-given prin-
ciple is under attack... There are those in our society that
try to shift us away from a society based on religious principles
to humanistic principles; that the human being can do what-
ever they [sic] want, as long as it feels good and does not hurt
others.
When one State wants to move towards the recognition of
same-sex marriages, it is wrong.... We as a Federal Govern-
ment have a responsibility to act, and we will act.7'
The Aguillard Court first directed the inquiry into the sincerity of
a claimed legislative purpose toward the legislative history of the bill,
in that case the Balanced Treatment Act. Some statements by the Act's
sponsor, for instance, expressed views antithetical to the stated goal of
the Act, while others plainly revealed his religious objections to evolu-
tion. Additionally, the Court in Stone v. Graham ruled that the
"plainly religious" nature of the Ten Commandments overwhelmed
any ostensibly secular purpose for their required posting.7
The legislative history of DOMA shows it is similarly "plainly re-
ligious" in both scope and purpose in the mind of the sponsor, and
the combined impact of these rulings compel the judgment that
DOMA transgresses the Establishment Clause. This section catalogs
statements from the record which took the form of either a positive
assertion that the American marriage tradition is a divine revelation,
or a Biblically-inspired condemnation of homosexuality.
The very definition of "marriage" that DOMA seeks to defend
comes from the fundamentalist Christian tradition. DOMA support-
ers clearly envision marriage as a religious practice, and often go so far
as to deny any credible role of government in its regulation at all. As
71. 142 CONG. REc. H7486 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer).
72. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980).
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such, DOMA's goal to protect marriage is transparently an effort to
foster one particular religious perspective on families.
House speakers on behalf of DOMA do not leave any doubt
whence comes this institution of marriage. Representative Sensen-
brenner notes that "[t]raditional heterosexual marriage ... has been
the preferred alternative by every religious tradition in recorded his-
tory." 3 The central issue is the authority by which marriages are
formed. Representative Hutchinson from Arkansas believes "that mar-
riage is a covenant established by God."" Representative Talent from
Missouri agrees: "[T]he institution of marriage is not a creation of the
State.... [Rather, ilt has been sanctified by all the great monotheistic
religions and, in particular, by the Judeo-Christian religion which is
the underpinning of our culture.""
Only twice in the record from the House does anyone protest this
infusion of religious dogma into the process of law-making. Repre-
sentative Jackson of Illinois warned that "religious groups may not
govern who receives a civil marriage license.... [W]hen I came to
Congress, I placed my hand on the Bible and swore to uphold the
Constitution; now, I am being asked to place my hand on the Con-
stitution and uphold the Bible."7  Representative Frank, who
organized and led an admirable fight against DOMA, objected to the
characterization of marriage as a sacrament. "We have no power to
give anyone any sacraments. We are not in the business of dispensing
sacraments, and I hope we never get there."n
Similar appeals to religious teaching as the source of the marriage
tradition warranting DOMA protections were voiced in the Senate.
73. House hearing, supra note 9, at 33 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
74. 142 CONG. REc. H7442 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).
DOMA's sponsor, Representative Canady, stated a similar view when he opined, "the
traditional fimily structure ... comports with nature and with our Judeo-Christian
moral tradition." 142 CONG. REc. H7441 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Canady).
75. 142 CONG. Rac. H7446 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Talent)
(emphasis added). Similar denials of a role for human government in the creation and
management of marriage are found in a piece by James Q. Wilson, Against Homosex-
ualMarriage, which states that "thinking of laws about marriage as documents that
confer or withhold rights is itself an error of fundamental importance." James Q.
Wilson, Against Homosexual Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE LEGAL AND
MoRAL DEAm 137, 144 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997)
[hereinafter DEBATE].
76. 142 CONG. REc. H7496 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson).
77. 142 CONG. REc. H7500 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Frank).
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Senator Byrd of West Virginia led the charge against same-sex mar-
riage. After quoting from his family Bible, he intoned this warning:
"Woe betide that society, Mr. President, that fails to honor that heri-
tage and begins to blur that tradition which was laid down by the
Creator in the beginning."71 Senator Coats of Indiana repeats the ar-
gument made in the House that marriage is not a civil institution.
"The definition of marriage is not created by politicians and judges,
and it cannot be changed by them. It is rooted in our history, in our
laws and our deepest moral and religious convictions, and in our na-
ture as human beings."" Senator Burns likewise refers to the "holy
estate of matrimony" and "the sanctity of marriage,"" while Senator
Bradley from New Jersey "believe[s] marriage is, first of all, a pre-
dominantly religious institution." 1 Only Senator Robb contradicted
these gentlemen, reminding them that "at its core marriage is a legal
institution officially sanctioned by society through its Government."
2
These statements suffice to demonstrate that the tradition of mar-
riage as depicted throughout the DOMA debate derives from religious
doctrine. The fact that many speakers would deprive civil government
of any genuine authority to legislate in this area argues that this tradi-
tion is intended still to retain its religious character.
Further proof of the influence of religion on DOMA is that both
sides brought witnesses who represented religious bodies before the
House Committee. Their mere presence flags the debate as one of
sectarian concern. Rabbi David Saperstein spoke against DOMA on
behalf of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, saying that
"The love that God calls us to, the love that binds two people together
in a loving and devoted commitment, is accessible to all God's chil-
dren. Let the state acknowledge that." 3 Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief
Counsel for the fundamentalist Christian American Center for Law
and Justice, defended DOMA by asserting the Full Faith and Credit
canard. 4 He pointedly identifies the religious issues at stake, however,
when he states his belief that "the family [is] the primary social and
78. 142 CONG. REc. S1,110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
79. 142 CONG. REc. S10,113 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats).
80. 142 CONG. REc. S1,117 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bums).
81. 142 CONG. REc. S10,125 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
82. 142 CONG. REc. S10,122 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robb).
83. House Hearing, supra note 9, at 211 (testimony of Rabbi David Saperstein).
84. As discussed infra Part III.B., Section 2 of DOMA responds to the fear that this con-
stitutional provision could force all states to recognize same-sex marriages solemnized
elsewhere. Complete review, however, shows this fear to be unfounded.
1997]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
religious institution of a just society," that "'the family is the first
church,"' and that as such his sect was adamant that the definition of
"family" not be expanded or changed in any way."
Radio talk show host Dennis Prager, also a witness at the House
hearing, gives his spin on theology this way:
[T]he Bible maintained that in order to become fully human,
male and female must join. In the words of Genesis, 'God cre-
ated the human ... male and female He created them.' The
union of male and female is not merely some lovely ideal; it is
the essence of the Jewish and Christian outlooks on the hu-
man experience. s6
In addition to these religious takes on marriage, the House record
reveals a deep, religious disapproval of homosexuality. Representative
Coburn of Oklahoma claims to represent a district with "very pro-
found beliefs that homosexuality is wrong... They base that belief
on what they believe God says about homosexuality."" Representative
Funderburk cites the Christian fundamentalist Family Research
Council for his information that homosexuality "is inherently wrong
and harmful to individuals, families, and societies."88 Representative
Studds suggests that comments made in the aisle are even more pro-
vocative than those which actually made it into the written record,
and included use of such terms as "promiscuity, perversion, hedonism,
narcissism.., depravity and sin."89 He likens the mood to "some kind
of revival meeting" whereat he was "about to be preached at froth Le-
viticus." 0 Indeed, a witness before the Senate, David Zwiebel of
85. House Hearing, supra note 9, at 216-17 (testimony of Jay Alan Sekulow) (quoting
Keith Fournier, the American Center for Law and Justice's Executive Director).
86. House Hearing, supra note 9, at 131 (prepared statement of Dennis Prager) (omission
in original) (citation omitted).
87. 142 CONG. Rnc. H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn).
88. 142 CONG. REc. H7487 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Funderburk).
89. 142 CONG. Ric. H7491 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Studds).
90. 142 CONG. REc. H7491 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Studds). Rep.
Studds notes that since the very next Levitical prohibition is against the eating of
shellfish, his district would probably not appreciate this standard. How, indeed, "do
the faithfil determine which Levitical traditions ought to be compromised?" WiL-
LuM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., Tir CASE FOR SAME-SEX MRRIAGE 101 (1996). My
conclusion, arrived at through observing the devout, is simple: If the prohibition
burdens other people, it is to be strictly enforced; if it burdensyour own conduct, it is
"outmoded" and may be ignored. "Christians have prescribed crosses for others while
exalting themselves." Roger L Shinn, Homosexuality: Christian Conviction and In-
quiry, in HoMOsEAs.y AND ETIcs 3, 6 (Edward Batchelor ed., 1980).
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Agudath Israel of America, gives life to Studd's fears when he asserts
that "Leviticus is not irrelevant" 9' to secular law-making.
Representative Canady of Florida, sponsor of DOMA, unabash-
edly proclaims his disgust for homosexuals, "I hope that many can be
rescued from that lifestyle and returned to where they can have a
happy lifestyle, because I think it's inherently destructive." 2 Canady's
later comments further demonstrate antigay bias, and grounds this
bias in his religious faith: "the traditional family structure ... com-
ports with nature and with our Judeo-Christian moral tradition....
Our law should not treat homosexual relationships as the moral
equivalent of the heterosexual relationships on which the family is
based."93
The sponsor of DOMA speaks in religious tones even more
striking than did the sponsor of the Balanced Treatment Act. If the
Court in Aguillard judged this moderate language to impugn the sin-
cerity of a purported secular purpose, so must DOMA's more overtly
religious self-justification prove a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Moreover, similar statements by other Congress members
demonstrate that Canady's understanding of the religious purposes of
DOMA was neither isolated nor idiosyncratic, but instead reflected
the explicit opinion of a substantial percentage of representatives and
senators. The Balanced Treatment Act breached the Establishment
Clause even without such corroboration. The legislative history of
DOMA clearly marks this law as constitutionally offensive.
91. The Defense ofMarriage Act:. Hearing in S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
dary, 64th Cong. 53 (1996) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (prepared statement of
David Zwiebel).
92. House Hearing, supra note 9, at 237.
93. 142 CONG. REc. H7441 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady). He
tries to defend himself against charges of utter bigotry by spreading the blame
around:
[Seventy] percent [of the American people] or more oppose same-sex mar-
riages. Seventy percent of the American people are not bigots. Seventy
percent of the American people are not prejudiced. Seventy percent of the
American people are not mean-spirited, cruel, and hateful. It is a slander
against the American people to assert that they are.
142 CONG. REc. H7447 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady).
"Surely," it has been observed, "unreason cannot be so widespread." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 536 (1961) (Frankfimer, J., concurring). If that were true,
of course, there would have been no slavery. Popular acclaim does not make some-
thing right.
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B. DOMA Confers No New Powers
The statute at issue in Aguillard, the Balanced Treatment Act,
opened itself up to suspicion of unconstitutionally imparting religious
messages via state law because it failed to bestow any new power or
authority upon the teachers.
Any law which is ineffective, which does not change legal reality,
must still be presumed to be "doing" something. If it is not working
in the usual sense, that is, if legal reality has not been changed, such a
law is perhaps serving merely as a symboL 4 This law is expressive of
some vision or ideal. Not all symbolic laws are inappropriate. How-
ever, once an enactment has been identified as a symbolic law instead
of an effective law, the door opens for further inquiry into what kind
of symbol the law embodies. Specifically, is it a religious symbol? Had
the law been effective as well as symbolic, perhaps it might have es-
caped this extra scrutiny.
The ineffectiveness of DOMA has been particularly well devel-
oped relative to Section 2. Section 2 of DOMA provides an
exemption for states from any Full Faith and Credit obligations to
recognize extraterritorial same-sex marriage. Professor Strasser argues,
however, that no such obligation exists:
The history of choice of law in the context of the recognition
of interracial marriages makes dear that states can assure that
they will not have to recognize same-sex marriages, even if
validly contracted in another state, as long as that intent is
made explicit. Unless or until the Supreme Court rules that
states may not preclude same-sex partners from marrying,
states can take certain explicit measures to assure that they will
not be forced to recognize same-sex marriages."
In other words, states already have all the power and authority
they need to resolve this problem. Section 2 of DOMA gives them
nothing they do not already possess. "[Blecause Congress apparently•• 96
did not understand the current system" of marriage recognition,
Section 2 of DOMA is poorly drafted relative to this problem. Conse-
quently, "those states given the option by DOMA to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages already have that option [through well-
94. SeeWaUace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-61 (1985).
95. STRASSER, supra note 10, at 117.
96. STRASSm, supra note 10, at 126.
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established principles of choice of law public policy exceptions], and
those states not having that option will not have suddenly acquired it
through DOMA. "97
Aguillard does not consider it relevant to ask whether the law-
makers believed the laws would authorize new authority. For the
Court all that mattered was that the law in actual practice had no such
effect.9" Like the law at issue in Aguillard, Section 2 of DOMA grants
no new powers, and hence this part at least may be impermissibly
symbolic."
97. STRASSER, supra note 10, at 132. This fact has not dissuaded Republicans from ad-
vertising DOMA as strengthening states' rights. As Representative Frank observed,
however, "there is [not] any principle ... more frequently enunciated and less fre-
quently followed than States' rights from the Republicans." 142 CONG. REc. H7482
(daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Frank). Frank is certainly right that the
spirit of DOMA runs against the espoused concerns of conservatives to devolve power
from Washington back to the states. This principle seems to be appropriate only for
economic issues. For matters of social and cultural concern, Republicans are only too
eager for Washington to issue mandates in their favor, such as when they seek con-
stitutional bans on abortions. Scholars have noted this internal philosophical
contradiction before:
What was jarring in the light of history was the willingness of fundamen-
talists, whose general conservatism on government social policies could be
explained by their traditional fears of the state, were ready to entertain
strong state action to criminalize and stigmatize homosexuals who did not
belong to the Southern Baptist Convention, whose practices posed no
threat to public order, and whose own religion placed faith in a God who
did not reject them because of their sexual preferences. A state that can ban
homosexuals solely because of their purported deviation from religiously
grounded moral law and the Scriptures of a particular religious tradition,
however widely that tradition is shared, can ban Jews and can ban Baptists.
ISAAC KRAMNICICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTn-TUTON: THE
CASE AGArNST REUGIOUS CORRcn ESS 129 (1996). "When the Moral Majority and
the Reaganites speak of rights and freedoms they almost always use these words to
mean their right to interfere with the lives of others." DENNIs ALTmAN, THE HOMO-
SEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, AMERICANIZATION OF THE HoMosmcuAL 218 (1982).
98. Aguillard, for example, reaches its conclusion that the Balanced Treatment Act does
not further its stated purpose based upon what the Act does or does not "provide" or
"grant." Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 587. At no point does the Court weigh what the Act
was intended or believed to "provide" or "grant."
99. Section 3 of DOMA may also fail to survive scrutiny by this standard. The denial of
federal benefits to same-sex marriages is without effect since no such couples exist.
But since such marriages may occur at some time in the future, Section 3 analysis by
the "no new powers" criterion would be more difficult and less certain than the Sec-
tion 2 analysis.
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C. Underinclusivity
Aguillard faults the Balanced Treatment Act for failing to operate
in a manner commensurate with its articulated purpose. Allegedly in-
tended by its authors to foster educational fairness, it instead favored
creation science. This operational underinclusivity relative to its stated
purpose contributed to the Act's transgression of the Establishment
Clause. DOMA is similarly underinclusive relative to its claimed
goals.
The legislative history for Section 3 of DOMA introduces only
one secular reason for its passage: the economic burden upon federal
benefit programs. Federal acceptance of same-sex marriages, even
state-validated ones, would allegedly overtax current programs which
allow for spousal benefits. The immediate problem with this reason
lies with the untrue claim that "a whole new group of beneficiaries"
would be created if same-sex marriages were recognized. Senator
Gramm claimed, for example:
A failure to pass this bill, if the Hawaii court rules in favor of
same-sex marriages, will create ... a whole group of new
beneficiaries-no one knows what the number would be-
tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, potentially more-
who will be beneficiaries of newly created survivor benefits
under Social Security; Federal retirement plans, and military
retirement plans. It will trigger a whole group of new benefits
under Federal health plans. And not only will it trigger these
benefits for the Federal Government, but under the full faith
and credit provision of the Constitution, it will impose-
through teacher retirement plans, State retirement plans, State
medical plans, and even railroad retirement plans-a whole
new set of benefits and expenses which have not been planned
or budgeted for under current law.00
100. 142 CONG. REC. SI0,106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
The State of Hawaii appeals to this same reasoning in its attempt to prevent the court
from permitting same-sex marriages:
The [present] marriage law furthers the compelling state interest in pro-
tecting the public fisc from the reasonably foreseeable effects of approval of
same-sex marriage. This concern results from the reallocation of fiscal re-
sources to a greatly expanded group of persons and the potential
destruction of the rational basis for the definition of the class of persons
entitled to such benefits. If procreation is not a class limitation, then the
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As phrased in more polemical rantings, "if you do not believe it is
fiscally responsible to throw open the doors of the U.S. Treasury to be
raided by the homosexual movement, then the choice is very
clear .... )01
This argument is clearly a red herring. Consider a man, Don,
who has paid into Social Security all his working life, and is thereby
entitled to spousal and other benefits for himself and his wife. But
suppose another man, John, who likewise contributes to the Social
Security program, never marries. The system may perhaps enjoy a
windfall from never having to pay spousal benefits on John's behalf,
payments for which it is otherwise liable, as in the case of Don. But
the fact remains that John is entitled to make the claim for spousal
benefits by virtue of his own contributions, and the system had better
be structured so as to be able to handle his claim should he later
choose to marry and exercise his rights. The sex of the spouse is inde-
pendent of the financial obligations of the system; if it cannot afford
to pay for John's male spouse, it is unclear how it would suddenly
have the money to pay for his female spouse. Either the money is
there, or it is not.
Authorizing same-sex marriages will therefore not be creating a
"new class of beneficiaries." Rather, it would allow citizens already
contributing to the social security program to direct the benefits, to
which they are already entitled and for which the program is already
liable, toward persons of their own choosing. If the benefit programs
cannot handle these legitimate claims, then that is indicative of mis-
management of the programs, and not a ground to deny contributors
their rights.
Assume, however, that DOMA proponents are correct, that "new
beneficiaries" would be created. What is the likely impact upon the
system of laws allocating benefits will fail. The entire system of laws gov-
erning domestic relations and marital benefits will have to be totally
restructured.
In addition, same-sex couples will have cause to permanently relocate
to Hawaii to avoid the non-recognition of their unions in their home
states. This may impose unique and potentially disproportionate burdens
on private and public resources in Hawaii. Such an increase in the popula-
tion could distort the job and housing markets, increase demand for
government and private services, and tax the natural resources of the State.
Defendant State of Hawaii's Pre-Trial Memorandum at 4-5, Baehr v. Miike, 1996
WL 94235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996)(No. 91-1394-05).
101. 142 CONG. REc. H7488 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr).
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programs they fear would be harmed? Probably very little. Senator
Kerrey of Nebraska reasonably finds that at most only two percent of
the population would be impacted,0" a number surely too small to
seriously cripple the identified programs. We should examine this ob-
jection, however, in its best possible light. Under Establishment
Clause analysis, Congress retains the privilege of being wrong so long
as it is sincere. Does the record reflect this worry about fiscal impact
as genuine? Does Congress behave in the way we would expect a leg-
islating body to behave when seriously addressing a true problem? The
answer would seem to be, "No."
Despite the expressed worries of the Republican majority, no
study was conducted to ascertain the likely impact upon federal and
state benefit programs from recognizing same-sex unions. In fact, the
House explicitly turned back an amendment to DOMA which would
have commissioned a General Accounting Office study of these and
related questions.'0' Did they suspect that the details would not sup-
port their nebulous but fear-mongering accusations? The answer to
that we may never know; but we can safely conclude that ignorance of
the relevant details was demonstrably willful. This negligence under-
mines the claim that concern about impact upon benefit programs is a
sincere motivation to enact DOMA. That which is not important
enough for study is certainly not important enough to spur discrimi-
natory legislation. In any event, if the excuse of saving money has
already been rejected as sufficient reason "for federal law to displace
state law,"'04 it is unlikely that this same reason will justify federal de-
nial of civil liberties to the individual.
More pointedly, the fit between this fear of fiscal depletion and
the scope of Section 3 of DOMA is so poor as to render it fatally un-
derinclusive. For instance, Representative Schroeder's proposed
amendment, which was defeated, would have denied federal benefits
to subsequent marriages "until the person who left that marriage ha[d]
dealt with the first one in a property settlement based on fault.
[According to Schroeder, such a process] ... would save us gazillions
of dollars in welfare and child support and all sorts of things." 5 This
102. See 142 CONG. REc. S10,124 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Rep. Kerrey).
103. See 142 CONG. REc. H7503-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
104. STRAssER, supra note 10, at 150-51 (referring to United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341,348-49 (1966)).
105. 142 CONG. REc. H7273 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
Her suggestion .is reminiscent of the Wisconsin statute struck down by Zablocki v.
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proposal would seem far more in keeping with DOMA's putative goal
to preserve the family unit by making divorce more costly and less
easy. The proposal would also better protect benefit programs from
excessive claims by limiting benefits to subsequent spouses until the
prior spouse received an equitable settlement."°
DOMA is underinclusive in other respects as well. Besides re-
jecting Representative Schroeder's amendment, the House denied
other amendments which would have protected marriage from prob-
lems at least as pressing as the temptation to turn queer. For instance,
Rep. Packard explicitly includes "monogamy" as part of that
"traditional" understanding of marriage.' °7 However, Congress re-
jected attempts "to include the words non-adulterous and
monogamous to the definition of marriage" in DOMA.0° Moreover,
other issues which clearly impact heterosexual unions more seriously
than the counterexample of same-sex marriages, such as spousal abuse,
substance abuse, and easy divorce are hardly mentioned. In light of
these problems, if indeed the true goal of DOMA is to "defend mar-
riage," the question must be raised why it needs defense only from gay
men and lesbians entering into their own loving relationships.
The irony of DOMA is that its goal to foster stable heterosexual
unions would be better met if it permitted same-sex marriages, gay
and otherwise. Because gays and lesbians are not allowed an honorable
social bond with their preferred mates, many of them try to force
themselves into the only tolerated coupling, the heterosexual one. But
most of these unions fail or are otherwise suboptimal, built as they are
upon the frustration and repression of fundamental desires of at least
one partner.' The first gay-themed mainstream motion picture,
Making Love,"0 depicts just this story of a seemingly perfect marriage
collapsing as the husband discovers his true sexual orientation. One
Redhai 434 U.S. 374 (1978). That law sought to forbid remarriage to noncustodial
parents until they demonstrated that they were current in court-ordered support
payments and that the children could be reasonably expected not to be added to the
welfare roles in the near future. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375. The difference is that
while Wisconsin would have precluded remarriage, Rep. Schroeder's amendment
would have permitted remarriage but without federal benefits. Compare Zabocki, 434
U.S. at 375, with 142 CONG. REc. H7273 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Schroeder).
106. For a similar conclusion, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 90, at 107.
107. 142 CONG. REc. H7449 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Packard).
108. 142 CONG. Rac. H7448 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
109. See MICHAEL W. Ross, THE MARE HomosmuAa. MAN (1983).
110. MA..uNG LOv (20th Century-Fox, 1982).
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woman living in Selma, Alabama, said that all the gay men she knew
except for one had been married at some point, although none of the
lesbians of her acquaintance had gone this route.' Neil Miller reports
that similar marriage rates among gay men in Bismarck, North Da-
kota, led residents to fear that "AIDS would hit [heterosexual] families
in the state, not the gay population."". Some goodly percentage of
divorces must be attributed to the conservatives' attempt at funneling
all persons into an institution intended only for the truly and happily
heterosexual." 3 DOMA continues to force those homosexuals unwill-
ing to "buck" the system into heterosexual marriages, leading to
further divorces and unfulfilled lives, and thereby undermining and
devaluing the institution it seeks to protect.
The gap between what DOMA claims to do and what it actually
does is so great that the explicit secular purposes of DOMA are not
obviously sincere. The claim that an expanded definition of marriage
would adversely impact federal benefit programs fails utterly as a con-
vincing rationale for DOMA because no new liabilities are incurred by
the programs. DOMA advocates even forbade study of the issue to
ascertain whether the concerns were valid or not. Finally, DOMA is
suspiciously underinclusive relative to its stated goal of preserving
marriages, since it burdens only gays and lesbians but not adulterers or
wife-beaters, who also and more obviously undermine the tradition of
monogamous, non-adulterous heterosexual marriage for life. Thus,
DOMA fails the Aguillard inquiry into whether there exists an appro-
priate fit between a law's purpose and its operation. This result further
bolsters the likelihood that DOMA's purported purpose is not sincere,
but is instead a sham.
D. Historical Background ofDOMA
Aguillard directs that the search for true legislative intent can ex-
tend into the historical background against which DOMA was
enacted. Relevant investigations reveal that strong religious undercur-
rents set the tone for the sole previous instance of federal legislation
111. See NEIL MILLER, IN SEARCH Op GAYAMERICA 18 (1989).
112. MILLER, supra note 111, at 92.
113. See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEo. L.J. 261,
268 (1995); James B. Nelson, Gayness and Homosexuality: Issues for the Church, in
HoMosExAI.rr AND ETHICS 186, 197 (Edward Batchelor ed., 1980).
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upon marriage form: Congressional prohibition of Mormon polyg-
amy.
The polygamy issue provides a clear precedent for federal legisla-
tion that seeks to impose one version of Christian-based marriage
upon all Americans. This history taints any contemporary claim that
Congress was not acting under a similar impetus when it again legis-
lated upon this topic.
DOMA proponents repeatedly attempted to link same-sex mar-
riages with plural marriages, arguing that to condone the first removes
any consistent rationale to continue to forbid the second.'"1 The ar-
guments of religious fundamentalists and political conservatives
invoke both polygamy and homosexuality as examples of obvious un-
desirables, if not outright evils." '5 For instance, they are both on the
list of clearly "proscribable" activities according to our "unquestion-
able constitutional tradition.""6 The State of Georgia, in its brief for
Bowers v. Hardwick,"7 moaned that if the Court ruled that it could
not prohibit sodomy, it would not be able to forbid plural marriage."'
The federal government may legitimately legislate in the area of
domestic relations in those jurisdictions over which it has authority,
such as the District of Columbia and other territories. While federal
government has an obvious interest in defining the terms of its legal
codes, it does not have the authority to usurp powers delegated to the
114. See Cal Thomas, Marriage from God, Not Courts, in DEBATE, supra note 75, at 42, 43
("If gay 'marriage' becomes possible, then there is nothing stopping polygamists, or
anyone else, seeking redress of unique grievances."); see also Hadley Arkes, The Closet
Straight, in SAME-SEX MARMAGE PRO AND CON 154, 157-58 (Andrew Sullivan ed.,
1997) [hereinafter SAME-SEx MARRIAGE]; William Bennett, Leave Marriage Alone, in
SAME-SEx MARmAGE, supra, at 274, 275; Robert H. Knight, How Domestic Partner-
ships and "Gay Marriage" Threaten the Family, in DEBTE, supra note 75, at 108,
115.
115. In an ironic twist, the Mormon church was an aggressive opponent during the Ha-
waiian debate over same-sex marriage. Feeling that the state would argue a weak case
against same-sex marriage, they asked to be allowed to intervene. See Baehr v. Miike,
910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996). "But the church's notorious, if now repudiated, support
for unusual marital arrangements-such as polygamy-made it look hypocritical. To
many Hawaiians, especially women, the practice of men taking more than one wife
seemed at least as offensive as homosexuality." JOHN GALlAGHER & CHRis BuLL,
PERFECT ENEmIEs: THE REUGIOUS RIGHT, THE GAY MOvEMENr, AND THE PoLmrcs
OF THE 1990s 206 (1996).
116. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992).
117. Bowersv. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). -
118. Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia at 32-33, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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states, such as regulating marriage, even in the interests of "defining"
its terms. As Strasser states, "[biecause domestic relations law is
usually left to the states, Congress must establish that it has a very
important reason if it is justifiably to displace state law. Because
Congress has not met its heavy burden of justification, Section 3 of
DOMA involves an unconstitutional overreaching by Congress." 1 In
the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Congress in fact legislated
marriage form for the Utah territory. The following statutes serve as
the sole precedent for federal law-making on this topic.
Congress criminalized Mormon polygamy in the United States
territories by a series of acts including the Morrill Act of 1862, °20 the
Edmunds Act of 1882,"' and the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887.122
That polygamy was almost universally deemed a moral depravity is
taken largely as a given. As few presumably needed convincing on the
point, the record for the Morrill Act, for instance, reveals surprisingly
little discussion as to why polygamy is so evil.'2 In keeping with this
social consensus, moreover, some judges, such as James B. McKean,
Chief Justice of the Utah Territorial Supreme Court from 1870 to
1875, regarded "cleansing the country of polygamy" as some "sort of
religious cause."
24
The Supreme Court agreed with the Utah Supreme Court in
Reynolds v. United States2' and held that George Reynolds had vio-
lated the 1862 Morrill Act. The Court rejected Reynolds' argument
that because polygamy was mandated by Mormon theology, the prac-
tice should be granted First Amendment protections. The opinion
reviews the widespread condemnation of polygamy in Western civili-
zation, and accepts this opprobrium as determinative for the instant
119. STRASSER, supra note 10, at 147.
120. Morrill Act, ch. 126, §§ 1-3, 12 Star. 501-02 (1862).
121. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, §§ 1-9, 22 Stat. 30-32 (1882) (amended 1887, repealed
1909).
122. Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, §§ 1-2, 24 Star. 635 (1887).
123. The legislative and judicial history of antipolygamy efforts is exhaustively recorded in
a two-part law review article by Orma iUnford. Orma I-nford, The Mormons and the
Law: The Polygamy Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 9 UTAH L REv. 308 (1964), 9 UTAH L Rv.
543 (1965).
124. Linford, (pt. 1), supra note 123, at 330 n.103. There is some evidence that Justice
Waite, author of the Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), decision, viewed
his duties similarly and referred to Reynolds as his "sermon on the religion of polyg-
amy." Linford, (pt. 1), supra note 123, at 340 n.144.
125. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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case, but does not overtly consider how Western civilization came to
hold this opinion.
Where the Court was cautious and circumspect, Congress was
more forthright, and it is of course what was in Congress' mind which
is determinative under Aguillard analysis. The legislative history of the
Morrill Act reveals that religious umbrage dearly played a major role,
if it was not the originating factor, in the congressional proscription of
Mormon polygamy. The rise of Mormonism brought "our holy re-
ligion into contempt, [defied] the opinions of the civilized world, and
[invoked] the vengeance of Heaven by a new Sodom and a new Go-
morrah to attract its lightnings and appease its wrath. "I Congress
concluded that the Morrill Act "was a law respecting an establishment
of religion, but only 'if the odious and execrable heresy of Mormon-
ism can be honored with the name of religion."' 2 7 Quotes of
Congressional representatives at the time are revealing:
Polygamy has been declared a criminal offense by every state
and territory in the Union, and is regarded by the civilized
world as opposed to law and order, decency and Christianity;
and the prosperity of the state. Polygamy has gone hand and
hand with murder, idolatry, and every secret abomination.
Misery, wretchedness, and woe have always marked its path.
Instead of a being a holy principle, receiving the sanction of
Heaven, it is an institution founded in lustful and unbridled
passions of men, devised by Satan himself to destroy purity
and authorize whoredom.
28
Religious issues were clearly central to the legislators' purpose
when they outlawed polygamy. This fact is obvious even if, in the pre-
Lemon setting of the Reynolds decision, the Supreme Court failed to
weigh this consideration.
126. See Linford, (pt. 1), supra note 123, at 314 n.24 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 83-36
(1860)).
127. iUnford, (pt. 1), supra note 123, at 329 (quoting H.R RElP. No. 83-36, at 4 (1860)).
Congress actually got it backwards here. Whether or not a law is an establishment is
determined by the values embedded in the law itself, not by the religious nature of its
target. The Congressional statement more accurately depicts the body's spurning of
any Free Exercise complaints.
128. PHILIP L KILBRIDE, PLURAL MARRIAGES FOR OUR TIMES: A Rn1rENTED OPMON?
70 (1994) (quoting nineteenth century Congressman Shelby Cullom from Illinois
who had introduced an antipolygamy bill in 1870).
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The background of the Morrill Act particularly illustrates that
when the federal government has legislated on marriage form in the
past, the principle purpose was to achieve religious conformity. One
would not be unreasonably cynical to suspect that Congress' motives
with DOMA were similarly religious. To the extent that historical
precedence and background carries influence-and Aguillard holds
that this extent is great-the religious furor over polygamy casts a
constitutional shadow over DOMA. 9
E. Contemporaneous Context ofDOMA
Finally, Aguillard encourages and demonstrates an examination
into the social milieu that generated a challenged statute. The Bal-
anced Treatment Act gave voice to a broad sectarian fervor within
Louisiana. Because the Act could not extricate itself convincingly from
these illegitimate roots, it fell before the Establishment Clause. The
religious context of DOMA is at least as pervasive, and consequently it
should meet a similar demise.
1. Baehr v. Lewin' 30
Today, the contempt formerly reserved for polygamists is shown
towards homosexuals, as demonstrated by DOMA. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court seems poised to recognize gay and lesbian marriages.
Therefore, in anticipation, the United States Congress passed DOMA
to prevent the spread of legally recognized same-sex marriages.
In Baehr v. Lewin, three couples challenged Hawaii's refusal to
provide marriage licenses to same-sex couples under section 572-1 of
the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which restricts marital relations to a male
and a female. When the Hawaii Supreme Court heard the case, the
justices ruled that because Hawaii's constitution forbids discrimina-
129. The point bears repeating that the history relevant to the Aguillard analysis at this
point is not the lineage of the bill. The text of the anti-evolution law in Aguillardwas
not based on the anti-evolution law struck in Epperson. Rather, the history relevant to
the analysis is the history of society's treatment of the topic. In Aguillards case, that
was the history of anti-evolution sentiment on the part of the Christian fundamen-
talists. In DOMA's case, the relevant history is the same Christian fundamentalists'
ongoing attempts to bring civil marriage into line with religious union.
130. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993).
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tion on the basis of sex; Hawaii could justify section 572-1 only by
showing a compelling state interest in barring same-sex marriage that
is narrowly drawn to achieve those ends.' On remand to the Circuit
Court of Hawaii, Judge Kevin Chang ruled decisively in favor of the
plaintiffs.' The final outcome awaits the return appeal to the Hawaii
Supreme Court.
DOMA proponents fear that waves of gay and lesbian residents
from other states will junket to Hawaii and get married. Upon their
return the newly wedded couples will sue for recognition of their mar-
riages and those state benefits deriving from their legal marriage in
Hawaii. The anticipated tool for these judicial challenges would be the
section of the federal constitution that states that "[flull [flaith and
[cIredit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other State." 33 Many states have passed
legislation explicitly forbidding the recognition of extrajurisdictional
same-sex marriages. 3
Technically, DOMA forbids "same-sex marriages," gay or other-
wise. Two same-sex heterosexuals are equally barred by DOMA from
marriage. In practice, however, the majority of the beneficiaries of the
right to same-sex marriage would be homosexuals. "Gay marriage"
subsequently becomes focal, with the attitudes toward homosexuals
thereby emerging as the predominant issue.
DOMA advocates gave free voice to their hatred for gays and les-
bians, and pointed to their private religious faiths as the source and
fount of that hatred.'3 ' If religiosity supports oppression of homosexu-
als, then antigay legislation such as DOMA can presumptively be
assumed to be a reflection of or a response to that religious undercur-
131. See Lewin, 852 P.2d at 67 (holding "that (1) HRS § 572-1 is presumed to be uncon-
stitutional (2) unless Lewin, as an agent of the State of Hawaii, can show that (a) the
statute's sex-based dassification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the
statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples'
constitutional rights").
132. See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996).
133. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
134. According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, as of the end of 1996, six-
teen states had anti-same-sex marriage laws on the books, with one state pending.
Twenty others had defeated or withdrawn such legislation, and in only thirteen states
had the question not been raised. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Capital
Gains and Losses: A State-by-State Review of Gay-Related Legislation in 1996, at 2.
135. See discussion supra Part IIILA. (presenting the religiously-oriented comments entered
into the official legislative history by DOMA advocates).
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rent. The next section therefore more closely studies the relationship
between Christian fundamentalism and homosexuality.
2. Religion and the Homosexual
Even the most shallow review'm must conclude that gays and les-
bians are pariahs in the eyes of many members of modern American
society. 37 The question at issue here is how much of this oppression
and bigotry can be lain at the feet of institutional Christianity.
Enough has been said in prior sections easily to conclude that funda-
mentalist Christianity often expresses strong antigay opinions; it is
important to distinguish whether these statements merely reflect or
actually generate societal homophobia.
For those who have a conception of Christianity as the source of
things tolerant and good-hearted, an early conundrum of social psy-
chology is a devastating self-revelation. Gordon Allport and J. Michael
Ross reviewed and amplified the findings that regular church atten-
dance was a reliable positive indicator of racial prejudice.' Based
136. A more-than-shallow history of the early gay movement, and a description of social
and political conditions before and after the watershed event of June 27-29, 1969, at
Stonewall, is given by TOBY MAROTrA, TiE PoI.mcs ors HoMoscwAurr (1981). A
review of just one year's worth of institutional antigay activity is collected in PEoPI
FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, HosviLE CwmuTE 1995: A STATE BY STATE REPORT ON
ANrI-GAYAcnvnY (1995).
137. See e.g., JoHN GERAssI, THE Boys os' Boisn (1966); JOHN Mrrz L, THE BosToN SEx
SCANDAL (1980) (documenting dramatic instances of literal witch-hunts); Dennis
Prager, Homouarliy, the Bible, and Us-A Jewish Perspective, in SamE-Sax MAR-
RIAGE, supra note 114, at 61, 65 (claiming that "[i]n order to become filly human,
male and female must join," and because homosexuals are therefore less than human,
a laundry list of oppressions is justified if not a moral imperative). In October of
1992, U.S. sailor Allen Schindler was beaten to death, battered beyond recognition
by his shipmates because he was gay. See Mark Schoofs, Life after Death, ADVOCATE,
July 13, 1993, at 32. While such blatant episodes of actual efforts to eradicate homo-
sexuality if not homosexuals are rare, the fear of being caught up in one is not
unfounded, and haunts the daily life of most gays and lesbians. Homosexuals live un-
der a sword of Damocles held aloft only by the thin thread of tacit heterosexual
tolerance which can be withdrawn at any time, as was demonstrated by Colorado's
attempts to remove fundamental political remedies from its homosexual citizens in its
ill-fated Amendment 2. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). What more
need be said than to point out that, in his dissent to Romer, Justice Scalia argues that
Coloradans are not merely constitutionally permitted to despise homosexuals, rather,
they "are, as I say, entitled to be hostile." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633.
138. Gordon W. Allport & J. Michael Ross, PersonalRelgious Orientation and Prjudice, 5
J. PEasoNAx=r & Soc. PsYcHoL. 432 (1967).
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upon a self-report questionnaire, the authors identified four
"orientations," or styles of being religious. These religious styles inter-
acted differently with racial prejudice.'39 While the intrinsically
religious are less prejudiced than the extrinsically religious, the most
prejudiced of all are those they termed "indiscriminately prorelig-
ious."'40 And although the "good" or intrinsically religious church-
goers are less prejudiced than the other types, they constitute a mi-
nority of church attendees overall.'
4'
People who are racial bigots tend to hold prejudicial views on
other groups as well. 42 Consequently, church attendance should also
predict homophobia, or dislike for homosexuals. Empirical studies
support this link.'3 In one study, there was a regular step-wise pro-
gression between the frequency of church attendance and the score on
a homophobia test. While those who "never" went to church averaged
55.08 on the homophobia test, each increasing category of frequency
scored higher until those who attended "weekly" earned an increased
homophobia score of 66.19 on the test.'"
The simple fact of exposure to religious stimuli, therefore, in-
creases the likelihood of becoming more homophobic. Since religious
folk are reliably more homophobic than nonreligious individuals, any
139. See Allport & Ross, supra note 138.
140. Intrinsics are those we would characterize as being sincerely religious: they go to
church to worship God. Extrinsics are those who go to church mainly for social rea-
sons, such as to network for business opportunities or to cultivate social prestige. See
Allport & Ross, supra note 138, at 434. The "indiscriminately proreligious" are those
who "persist in endorsing any or all items [on the self-report questionnaire] that to
them seem favorable to religion in any sense." Allport & Ross, supra note 138, at 437
(emphasis added).
141. See Allport & Ross, supra note 138, at 432-34.
142. See Margaret M. Bierly, Prudice Toward Contemporary Outgroups as a Generalized
Attitude, 15 J. APPLImD Soc. PSYCHOL 189, 198 (1985) ("[P]rejudice is indiscrimi-
nate, not being limited to particular groups that may share some commonalities but
extending to groups that are quite different.").
143. Cf Sung-Mook Hong, Sex, Religion and Factor Analtcally Derived Attitudes Towards
Homosexualty, 4 AusmL J. SEx MAmAGE & FPA. 142, 142 (1983) ("As church at-
tendance increased, the [subjects'] attitude on both dimensions of homosexuality
became less liberal."); Knud S. Larsen et al., Anti-black Attitudes, Religious Orthodox,
Permissiveness, and Sexual Information. A Study of the Attitudes of Heterosexuab To-
ward Homosexuality, 19 J. SEx Rns. 105, 111-12 (1983) ("Religious orthodoxy,
another component in the syndrome of conservative positiveness, is also significantly
related to attitudes toward homosexuality.").
144. See Lynn E. Kunkel & Lori L Temple, Attitudes Towards AIDS and Homosexuals:
Gender, Marital Status, and Religion, 22 J. APPLMD Soc. PSYCHOL 1030, 1037 tbl.4
(1992).
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overt expression of homophobia, such as DOMA, could derive from
religious influences. Moreover, when the category of the "religious" is
parsed into the distinctive denominations, not all sects are equivalent.
Doctrines which are "fundamentalist" or "orthodox" (such as those
which adopt a literal as opposed to an interpretive approach to the
Bible) are regularly demonstrated to be particularly homophobic.'
The relationship between homophobia and religion, fundamen-
talist Christianity, is clear, pervasive and reliable. In itself this
relationship could open the door to interpreting expressions of homo-
phobia as religiously based. But the final constitutional bar is more
pertinently directed at causal, and not simply correlational relation-
ships. So while there is no question that homophobia correlates with
religion, is there any evidence that religion causes homophobia?'.
These seemingly sweeping generalizations about the nurturing
effect of Christian fundamentalism upon homophobia are buttressed
by simply paying attention to what religious leaders actually do. Con-
sider how a Mormon official in 1976 encouraged "young men to
145. See Bierly, supra note 142, at 193 ("[Fundamentalist) Christians were more preju-
diced toward homosexuals than were Catholics or those with no religion."); Larsen et
al., supra note 143, at 111 (stating a significant relationship between religious ortho-
doxy and a negative attitude towards homosexuality); Stephen M. Maret, Attitudes of
Fundamentalists Toward. Homosexuality, 55 PSYCHOL REP. 205 (1984)
("[F]tudamentalists showed more disapproval of homosexuality than nonfundamen-
talists . ... .)
-This relationship apparently holds true regardless of whether the fundamentalist
sect is Christian. See Bruce Hunsberger, Religious Fundamentalsm, Right-Wing
Authoritarianism, and Hostility Toward Homosexuas in Non-Christian Religious
Groups, 6 INT'LJ. FOR PSYCHOL. REUGIION 39 (1996).
146. Such a question cannot of course be answered definitively. All social phenomena are
determined by multiple variables. Just as no single cause can explain all cases of mur-
der or philanthropy, no single cause or source of homophobia should be expected to
be identified. Thus religion cannot be the only source of antigay furor.
If religion is a cause of homophobia, it can be expected to be a preponderant
one. In fact, many writers accuse religion of overtly cultivating an atmosphere of ho-
mosexual oppression. For example, one writer conduded that "Judaeo-Christianity
has ... encouraged homophobia in society, thereby fostering antigay oppression
which dehumanizes gay individuals... ."J. Michael Clark et al., Institutional Religion
and Gay/Lesbian Oppression, 14 MARRAGE & F.AM. RaV. 265 (1989)(emphasis
added). Bawer has said that "[o]f all prejudices, homophobia is the only one whose
spread has been fostered by a widespread belief that good Christian values require it."
BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TALE 88 (1993) (emphasis added). Finally, Dennis
Altman, a gay scholar, concluded that "homophobia of organized religion is not
merely a matter of ideology, it is an essential basis for its continued existence." ALT-
yN, supra note 97, at 63.
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physically assault any male" who appeared to be sexually interested in
them.4 7 This Mormon instruction is not distinguishable in spirit from
the assertion by Reverend Walter Alexander of Reno, Nevada's First
Baptist Church, "who has said that 'we should do what the Bible says
and cut their [homosexuals'] throats."'14 Reverend Moon (of the
"Moonies") is somewhat more lenient; rather than slitting their
throats, he would merely "hit [them] on the head with a baseball
bat." 9 One theologian argues that "even a monogamous lesbian cou-
ple who contributed mightily to the larger community by caring for
the homeless should be imprisoned or possibly even executed for their
sexual sins."'15
Not only should homosexuals be the object of religiously inspired
violence, but they should actually "enjoy getting beaten up by
'homophobes.""" This, at least, is the conclusion of Idaho Citizens
Alliance, an organization supported by the Christian Coalition.'52
Having gone this far, it is not at all surprising to read that Reverend
Lou Sheldon of the Traditional Values Coalition, approvingly re-
peated a notoriously antigay psychoanalyst's opinion that gay
youngsters are right to commit suicide "because they know within
themselves that it is not normal."
5"
147. D. MicHAEL QUINN, SAmE-Sax DYNAMIcs AMONG NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMEm-
cANs: A MORMON EXAmPLE 382 (1996). The author's history ends at this point, and
he does not say whether the Mormon Church later dissociated itself from this re-
sponse to homosexual interest.
148. BAWER, supra note 146, at 27-28.
149. MiLLuR, supra note 111, at 252.
150. GALLAGHER & BuLu, supra note 115, at 272.
151. GAL.AGHER BuLL, supra note 115, at 243.
152. GALLAGHER & BULL, supra note 115, at 243.
153. GALLAGHER & But, supra note 115, at 256. One such teen wrote to advice colum-
nist Ann Landers, expressing his anguish unto suicide over his certainty that he is gay.
Teen Considers Suicide over His Gender Identity, Timns-PIcAwUNE (NEw ORLEANs),
May 25, 1997, E6. One should note that, despite the title to the column, the boy is
not lamenting his gender identity, but rather his sexual orientation. To confuse the
two is to assume that male homosexuals are "really" women. Unfortunately, psycho-
analysts and sociologists have confused the two both historically and currently. See
LEo BEasAm, Homos 129-51 (1995) (stating that the confusion is at the root of
Proustian sociology and afflicts old-school Freudian psychoanalysts); Report of the
Hawaii Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law, reprinted in DEBATE, supra
note 75, at 211, 222 (stating that the dissenting minority conclusion supported their
claim that the state had a compelling interest in preventing such unions by quoting
Dr. Socarides: "The families of homosexual patients I have treated are markedly defi-
cient in carrying out many of the functions necessary for the development of an
integrated heterosexual child. Distorting influences are very profound in families in
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Televangelist Pat Robertson, of the 700 Club, equates Nazism
with homosexuality saying, "Many of those people involved with
Adolf Hitler were satanists. Many of them were homosexuals. The two
seem to go together. "" But if Christian religious leaders believe ho-
mosexuality to be as bad as all this, causing both Satanism and
genocide, it becomes less puzzling to hear the African-American Rev-
erend James Sykes concede that he would join with the Ku Klux Klan
in its antigay efforts declaring, "For all the bad the Klan does, they are
right about gays.""'
The catalog of only slightly less outrageous injuries is even
heftier. The Christian Scientists had a reporter at the Christian Science
Monitor fired because she declined to submit to church rituals to "heal
which the child is not helped to develop the appropriate gender-identity."); He's in
and He's out, ADvocATE, July 9, 1996, at 11, 11-12 (noting that the psychoanalyst
receiving Rev. Sheldon's beaming approval is Charles Socarides, whose gay son Rich-
ard Socarides became President Clinton's liaison to the gay and lesbian community).
Despite the mental health professions having removed homosexuality as an ill-
ness almost twenty years ago, see RommD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALIrn AND AMERICAN
PsYcHAuTY: THE PoLmcs OF DIAGNOSIS 193 (1981), regressive views such as
Socarides' are neither rare nor restricted to older practitioners. An entire new genera-
tion has arisen to continue to malign gays and lesbians. A columnist peddling fluff
psychology, "Dr. Laura" Schlessinger, hesitates not at all to diagnose homosexuality
as "a biological faux pas," "an error in proper brain development." Let's Remember the
Value ofHeterosexualParents, TMES-Pc:AYUNE (NEw ORLEANS), May 25, 1997, E5.
From "error" it is but a short step to correction, and thus we find Joseph Nico-
losi marketing his method of "reparative therapy." JOSEPH NicoLosi, HEALING
HoMosmcAlrm 211-23 (1993). In response to this regressive trend, at its 1997
meeting the members of the American Psychological Association passed a resolution
stating, in parr, that "psychologists will breech ethical guidelines if they tell potential
clients that there is effective 'reparative' or 'conversion' therapy for the treatment of
homosexuality." Jamie Talan, Psychologists Censure Gay 'Therapy; TIMpS-PicA'UNE
(NEW OR.ENS), August 15, 1997, A8.
154. GALLAGHER & BULL, supra note 115, at 276. Robertson seems blissfully inattentive to
the details of history. Aside from specific individuals, homosexuals, instead of being
the cozy collaborators in Hitler's bid for world domination, were among the groups
of "deviants," which included also Jews and gypsies, selected for systematic extermi-
nation in the concentration camps. See, e.g., HEINz HEGER, THE MEN wITH THE
PINK TRiANGLE 7-18 (David Fembach trans., 1980); IAN YOUNG, GAY REsISTANcE
(1985).
Other fundamentalists express opinions similar to Robertson's. For instance,
Kevin Abrams, co-author of The Pink Swastika.. Homoscualily in the Nazi Party, de-
fends the thesis that "gays were the perpetrators, not the victims, of Nazi terrorism."
PEOPLE FOR THE AMUmcAN WAY, supra note 136, at 25.
155. GALLAGHER & BUL, supranote 115, at 171.
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herself of her homosexuality.""6 The Universal Fellowship of
Metropolitan Community Churches, a denomination founded to
minister to gays and lesbians ostracized by other Christian
denominations,"57 repeatedly fails in its bid to join the National
Council of Churches.""8 The Southern Baptist Conference expelled
two congregations for being insufficiently condemnatory towards
homosexuals." 9 This same body recently called for a boycott of all
Disney businesses because the company was too gay-friendly, offering
domestic partner benefits to their employees, and owning ABC, which
highlighted the coming-out of Ellen.'6 Meanwhile, the question of
ordaining "practicing" homosexuals may cause a schism in the
Presbyterian Church.'
Finally, the Roman Catholic Church issued a document which
"condones discrimination against gays and lesbians and that urges
bishops to take an active position against nondiscrimination laws."
62
The highest ranking Roman Catholic official in Brooklyn labeled ho-
mosexuality "a basic human disorder."
63
The list of wrongs perpetrated would be even longer if it included
those which arise not just from the "homosexuality" issue, but also
those which emerge from fears and misinformation about AIDS.)
156. Chris Bull, Blindsided by Christian Science: Monitor Radio Suspends Two Newsmen
over AIDS Story, ADvocATr, Sept. 8, 1992, at 21, 21.
157. For the history of the Metropolitan Community Churches, see TRoY D. PERRY,
DON'T BE AFRAID ANYmoRE (1990). This book is the autobiography of the church's
founder, the Reverend Troy Perry.
158. See John Gallagher, Is God Gay?, AVocATE, Dec. 13, 1994, at 40, 41.
159. See BAwER, supra note 146, at 56-57. The American Baptist Churches of the West
similarly sanctioned several of its own congregations for accepting gay and lesbian
members. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 136, at 33.
160. See David Heitm, Baptits take on Hercules, ADvocATE, July 22, 1997, at 42,42.
161. See Jeffery L Sheler, Sex and the Single Protestant, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 9,
1997, at 61. Similarly, the "University Baptist Church of Austin was expelled from
the Austin Baptist Association for ordaining a gay man as a deacon in 1994." PEOPLE
FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 136, -at 99 (emphasis omitted).
162. John Gallagher, Vatican Statement Condones Antigay Discrimination, A/vocATE, Aug.
25, 1992, at 21, 21. The document, issued by the Vatican's Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, is entitled "Some Considerations Concerning the Catholic Re-
sponse to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons."
Gallagher, supra, at 21.
163. News in Brief New York, AnvocATE, Feb. 9, 1993, at 24.
164. The virulent overlay of AIDS hysteria upon a basic homosexual animosity is chroni-
cled in RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYD ON: PoLmCs, PEOPLE, AND THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC, xxi-xxiii, passim (1987). Eleven percent of nurses at the Beth Israel
Medical Center in New York City, for instance, "agreed that AIDS is God's punish-
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But perhaps enough has been presented to underscore the point: a
climate of overt oppression and marginalization of gays and lesbians
pervades the American social milieu, and this climate is rooted in fun-
damentalist Christian ideology. 6' The litany of evils given above were
not perpetrated by renegades, but by church leaders of major religious
denominations; the list would be endless if it included also fringe sects
or idiosyncratic acts committed by individuals.'66
Religion is not merely correlated with homophobia. Rather, re-
ligion is responsible for cultivating and encouraging a large portion of
our society's homophobia. As Randall Terry, the founder of Opera-
tion Rescue, preached, "'I want you to let a wave of intolerance wash
over you. Our goal is a Christian nation. We have a biblical duty, we
are called by God, to conquer this country. We don't want equal time.
We don't want pluralism." 67 Simply stated, these Christians don't
want hom6sexuals.
DOMA found life within this broth of religiously-fueled antigay
propaganda. "It is difficult to imagine what explanation could be of-
fered for DOMA other than that of animus. 16' This animus is
predominantly a religious prejudice, just as Aguillard found the oppo-
sition to evolution to be. "Antigay measures in the United States are,
at their heart, orthodox Christian measures. Arguably, when they be-
ment to homosexuals.' Joel J. Wallack, AIDS Anxiety among Health Care Profession-
ak, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 507, 509 (1989). Discomfort in treating
homosexual patients was especially common among Protestant nurses (30%), but, at
the other extreme, did not appear at all amongJewish nurses. Wallack, supra, at 508.
165. In fairness, I do not mean to suggest that all religions are necessarily homophobic.
Not every religion invests emotional and social capital in demonizing gay men and
women. Unitarians and Quakers are notable exceptions. See generally DONNA SCAL-
cIoNE-CoNTI, A VoicE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY HUMAN RIGHTS: UNITARIAN
UmvEnsAusM (n.d.) (pamphlet); William A. Percy, Protestantism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF HomosEaLxurrv 1058, 1061 (Wayne R. Dynes ed., 1990) ('Quakers have been
in the forefront of homosexual toleration."). Some religions which currently burden
homosexuals with harsh recriminations have not always done so. Roman Catholicism,
for instance, has been revealed to have found antigay oppression in the thirteenth
century, relatively late in its institutional history. See JOHN BoswEuJ, CHRISTIANITY,
SOCIAL ToLERmcE, AND HoMosExuALTY (1980). The dispassionate student can
hope that such oppressive practices are not inherent and unchangeable dogma.
166. For instance, Fred Phelps has made a name for himself picketing funerals of AIDS
victims. A disbarred lawyer, Phelps is pastor of a Baptist sect whose members are
limited largely to members of his own family. See Chris Bull, Us vs. Them: Fred
Phelps, AnvocAT, Nov. 2, 1993, at 42, 43-44.
167. URVASHI VAID, VRTUAL EQuALITY 308 (1995).
168. STRASSER, supra note 10, at 139.
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come legislation, the establishment clause is violated."'69 This fact casts
DOMA in the light of a religiously-inspired antigay statute. DOMA
therefore becomes susceptible to charges of being an unconstitutional
establishment of religion.
CONCLUSION
It will probably be a very long time before any court rules on the
constitutionality of DOMA. In most contexts of constitutional law; to
have standing to bring suit one must have suffered personal harm.
Since as yet no one can marry a same-sex partner in any state, the pro-
visions of DOMA do not impact a single individual. Only after at
least one state legalizes gay unions, and after members of those unions
are denied federal benefits or recognition in other states, could one
imagine a first complaint being filed.
If an Establishment Clause claim against DOMA were brought, a
court would have to apply the standard established by Lemon and
Aguillard; DOMA must have a primary and sincere secular purpose.
Further, Aguillard indicated six places where one must look to ascer-
tain that purpose, including the text of the statute, its legislative
history, and the historical and social context which nurtured and gen-
erated the statute.
DOMA has no secular purpose that is primary and sincere. DOMA
stands as a symbol of legislative support for fundamentalist Christianity.
Indeed, the legislative history records the blatant religious urgency of
the bill's sponsor and supporters. Moreover, while Section 2 of DOMA
grants no new powers and thus functions solely as a religious symbol,
the operation of Section 3 of DOMA is fatally underinclusive relative to
its alleged secular goals. Because the only other exercise of Congressional
authority over marriage form evolved into an expression of religious
prejudice, Congress cannot be presumed to have been free of such im-
permissible influences when it passed DOMA. Finally, antigay
animosity, of which DOMA is an undeniable manifestation, and relig-
ious fimdamentalism are so tightly intertwined that the one implicates
the other. Failing as it does the Aguillard inquiry, DOMA's purposes are
demonstrably a "sham." DOMA is an unconstitutional establishment of
fundamentalist Christianity. t
169. DIIi HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT 168 (1997).
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